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Promotion tournaments play an important role for the provision of incentives in firms. In this 
paper, we extend research on single-stage rank-order tournaments and analyze behavior in 
multi-stage elimination tournaments. The main treatment of our laboratory experiment is a 
two-stage tournament in which equilibrium efforts are the same in both stages. We compare 
this treatment to a strategically equivalent one-stage tournament and to another two-stage 
tournament with a more convex wage structure. Confirming previous findings average effort 
in our one-stage treatment is close to Nash equilibrium. In contrast, subjects in our main 
treatment provide excess effort in the first stage both with respect to Nash predictions and 
compared to the equivalent one-stage tournament. The results for the more convex two-
stage tournament show that excess effort in the first stage is a robust finding and that 
subjects react only weakly to differences in the wage structure. 
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Promotions play an important role for the provision of incentives in ﬁrms and other
hierarchical organizations. According to Lazear and Gibbs (2008), they are probably
the most important source of extrinsic motivation for middle managers in most ﬁrms.
The prospect of being promoted to a better-paid job creates incentives to work hard,
even if current income is not tied to performance. In virtually all ﬁrms those who get
promoted compete again for subsequent promotions: in many companies, there are up
to a dozen hierarchical levels between the CEO and entry-level management (Belzil and
Bognanno 2008, Lazear and Gibbs 2008). The prevalence of internal labor markets is
also underlined by the fact that hiring is concentrated on lower levels of the hierarchy
and that positions on higher ranks are ﬁlled primarily through promotion (Baker et al.
1994, Bognanno 2001). In a seminal contribution, Rosen (1986) has modelled the
competition for promotion in such hierarchies as a multi-stage elimination tournament
where in each stage fewer agents are selected for the next step of the career ladder.
Incentives generated in such tournaments depend on two important components of the
organizational structure: the immediate wage increase for an agent who gets promoted
and the option value of competing in further stages of the tournament, i.e., having the
chance to earn even higher wages.
Although the importance of multi-stage elimination tournaments is undisputed,
stringent empirical tests of their incentive eﬀects are scarce. In this paper, we provide
a step towards closing this gap with the help of a controlled laboratory experiment.
Our main questions are: do people take future stages of a tournament into account
when deciding on current eﬀort? Are multi-stage elimination setups behaviorally dif-
ferent from simple one-stage tournaments? How does the wage structure in multi-stage
tournaments aﬀect the provision of eﬀort?
We study these questions by comparing three treatments. Our main treatment is
a two-stage tournament (TS) in which four subjects compete for being promoted to
the second stage. Promotion depends on subjects’ output which is a function of costly
1eﬀort and an individual noise term. The two subjects with the lowest output levels in
the ﬁrst stage are eliminated from further competition and receive a low wage. The two
subjects with the highest output levels in the ﬁrst stage are promoted, i.e., they are
allowed to take part in the second stage where they compete against each other again.
The subject with the highest second-stage output receives a high wage, whereas the
other ﬁnalist is paid an intermediate wage. Parameters in this treatment are chosen
to make the tournament incentive maintaining in the sense that equilibrium eﬀort is
identical in both stages (Rosen 1986).
We compare this treatment to a one-stage tournament (OS) in which four subjects
compete once for two top positions. Wages for the promoted subjects are chosen such
that the one-stage tournament is strategically equivalent to the ﬁrst stage of TS. This
means that promoted subjects in OS earn the sum of the intermediate wage in TS and
the monetary equivalent of the second-stage option value in that tournament, implying
that equilibrium eﬀort is the same in both treatments. Comparing OS and TS thus
allows testing whether strategic equivalence translates into behavioral equivalence. Our
third treatment (TSC) is identical to the TS treatment with the exception that the
wage structure is more convex, i.e., the intermediate wage is smaller in TSC. It is
designed to study how subjects react to diﬀerences in the wage structure. In particular,
we can test whether subjects—as predicted by theory—exert lower eﬀorts in the ﬁrst
and higher eﬀorts in the second stage under the more convex wage structure of TSC
compared to TS.
Our ﬁndings can be summarized as follows: First, average behavior is remarkably
close to the predictions of tournament theory in our one-stage treatment. This parallels
ﬁndings of previous experiments on symmetric one-stage tournaments (e.g., Bull et al.
1987, Orrison et al. 2004). Second, behavior in the TS treatment indicates that subjects
take the option value of future promotion possibilities into account when deciding on
their work eﬀort in multi-stage tournaments. Third, we also observe important depar-
tures from theoretical predictions in the TS treatment. Behavior in the ﬁrst stage of
TS diﬀers strongly both from the one-stage treatment and from theoretical predictions.
2Subjects exert signiﬁcantly higher eﬀorts in the ﬁrst stage of the two-stage tournament.
Fourth, the results of the TSC treatment conﬁrm the occurrence of excess eﬀort provi-
sion in the ﬁrst stage of the tournament. Subjects react only weakly to the change in
the wage structure, implying that ﬁrst-stage excess eﬀort is even higher in TSC. Finally,
the TS treatment is incentive maintaining in the sense that eﬀorts in the second stage
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from ﬁrst-stage eﬀorts.
Most promotion tournaments that we observe in ﬁrms and other hierarchical orga-
nizations have multiple stages. Our results indicate that the mechanisms of incentive
provision in multi-stage tournaments largely operate as suggested by theory. People do
not only respond to diﬀerences in prizes, or wages, but are also motivated by the option
value generated by future promotion possibilities. Our paper also provides insights with
regard to the question whether one-stage tournaments are behaviorally equivalent to
multi-stage designs. Adding one or more stages seems to make a fundamental diﬀerence,
as people tend to exert excess eﬀort in early stages of the tournament. This shows that
one cannot necessarily draw inferences from simple one-stage setups to more complex
tournaments.
The ﬁnding that people tend to exert excess eﬀort in early stages of a multi-
stage competition also has interesting organizational implications. If—as our ﬁndings
suggest—multi-stage competitions provoke excess eﬀort exertion by employees, this
may oﬀer a possible explanation why ﬁrms rely heavily on promotion based incentive
schemes even if more direct means of performance assessment and compensation are
available. Excess eﬀort makes a promotion tournament “cheaper” for principals com-
pared to other incentive schemes such as piece rates or bonus contracts. Moreover,
excess eﬀort inﬂuences the “optimal architecture” of promotion tournaments and other
contests (see Moldovanu and Sela 2006).
Our paper complements previous studies which have used ﬁeld data from executive
compensation, sports, or agricultural production to evaluate predictions of tournament
theory (e.g., Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990, Knoeber and Thurman 1994, Bognanno
2001). It has been found that many implications of tournament theory are consistent
3with empirical observations: for instance, higher prizes tend to increase performance
(Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990), wage proﬁles in the ﬁeld are convexly increasing
(Eriksson 1999), and winner prizes increase with the number of competitors (Bognanno
2001). An advantage of testing tournament theory with laboratory experiments is the
possibility to directly test pure incentive eﬀects of tournaments. For instance, one can
measure agents’ behavioral reactions to changes in the wage structure without being
concerned that the composition of the workforce might change due to the modiﬁed
incentive scheme (Lazear 2000, Dohmen and Falk 2006). Experimental data also allows
to rule out inﬂuences of unobservable variables that might aﬀect actual promotion
decisions in the ﬁeld, like agents’ soft skills or supervisor favoritism.
A number of previous papers have studied various aspects of tournaments in ex-
periments, such as the eﬀects of diﬀerent prize spreads (Bull et al. 1987, Harbring and
Irlenbusch 2003), sabotage activities (Falk et al. 2008, Harbring and Irlenbusch 2008)
or asymmetries in promotion chances (Schotter and Weigelt 1992). In contrast to our
paper this literature concentrates on one-stage tournaments. In view of our ﬁndings it
is not clear to what extent these previous ﬁndings translate to multi-stage setups. For
instance, more competitive behavior (excess eﬀort) in early stages might also lead to
an increase in sabotage activities in multi-stage tournaments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section presents a
simple model of multi-stage elimination tournaments on which our experiment is based.
Section 3 discusses our experimental design and derives hypotheses. Section 4 shows
the main results and section 5 concludes.
42 A simple model of multi-stage elimination
tournaments
We consider a simple elimination tournament in which four identical agents compete
for promotion.1 The promotion decision depends on relative output produced by the
agents. Competition consists of two stages: in the ﬁrst stage, all four agents compete
against each other. The two agents with the lowest output levels in that stage receive
a wage wlow and are eliminated from further competition. The two agents with the
highest output levels in the ﬁrst stage are promoted, i.e., they are allowed to take part
in the second stage (or “ﬁnal”) where they compete against each other again. The
agent who produces more output in the second stage receives a wage whigh, whereas the
other ﬁnalist gets an intermediate wage wmed. Note that the decision of who receives
whigh or wmed does not depend on the ﬁrst-stage output of the ﬁnalists.
This two-stage elimination tournament can be modeled as follows. In the ﬁrst
stage of the tournament four agents i = 1,2,3,4 compete against each other. Agents
who participate in stage k ∈ {1,2} individually produce output yi,k according to the
production function
yi,k = ei,k + i,k
where ei,k denotes the eﬀort level that agent i exerts in stage k. i,k is a random shock
faced by agent i in stage k. Shocks are assumed to be drawn independently for each
agent in each stage. For simplicity, we assume that i,k is uniformly distributed on the
interval [−q,q].2 Agent i’s output in stage k does not depend on previous eﬀort or
output and the production technology is identical for all agents i in all stages k. Agents
1Most of the assumptions below follow the classic (one-stage) tournament model introduced by
Lazear and Rosen (1981).
2Virtually all tournament experiments use the uniform distribution, primarily because its concept
is easy to understand for experimental subjects. The predictions of the model, however, can be
generalized to other distributions of shocks. Lazear and Rosen (1981) discuss which conditions have
to be fulﬁlled for the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies.










Note that this speciﬁcation implies separability of costs across stages, i.e., in line
with Rosen (1986) there is also no carry-over of costs between stages. Furthermore,
we assume that agents are identical and risk-neutral with utility functions which are
additively separable in wages and eﬀort costs
Ui(w,ei,1,ei,2) = w − C(ei,1,ei,2)
For the derivation of equilibrium predictions we restrict our attention to the set of
symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibria. The two-stage tournament can be solved
by backward induction. Because (i) the decision who wins the second stage solely
depends on the output of the ﬁnalists in this stage, (ii) there is no cost carry-over
between stages and (iii) the random terms are independently distributed both across
stages and agents, the ﬁnal of our two-stage tournament is equivalent to a simple one-
stage tournament in which two participants compete for a promotion. Given that agent
i has reached the second stage where two agents compete for one winner prize whigh and
one loser prize wmed, he chooses stage-two eﬀort ei,2 in order to maximize an expected
utility function of the following form:3
EUi(whigh,wmed,ei,2,ej,2) = π(yi,2 > yj,2)whigh + [1 − π(yi,2 > yj,2)]wmed − C(ei,1,ei,2)
π(yi,2 > yj,2) denotes the probability that i’s output in stage two is greater than
the output of agent j. With our assumptions regarding the production function and
random terms, this expression can be rewritten as follows:
EUi(whigh,wmed,ei,2,ej,2) = Fj,2−i,2[ei,2 − ej,2](whigh − wmed) + wmed − C(ei,1,ei,2)
3The parameters chosen in our experimental treatments (see below) ensure that all participation
constraints are fulﬁlled. We therefore do not explicitly consider them here.
6where Fj,2−i,2[·] denotes the cdf of the diﬀerence between random terms j,2, i,2. Max-
imizing EUi(·) over ei,2 yields the following ﬁrst-order condition:
fj,2−i,2(ei,2 − ej,2)(whigh − wmed) =
∂C(·)
∂ei,2
Assuming symmetry yields fj,k−i,k(0) = 1
2q for i,k,j,k ∼ U[−q,q]. The symmetric
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the two-stage tournament thus entails the following
second-stage eﬀort level e
∗,TS






Given that both ﬁnalists play this equilibrium, the expected utility gain in the ﬁnal,
i.e., the continuation value for an agent in the ﬁrst stage is given as follows
EVi,2 = wmed +
1
2







An agent who reaches the ﬁnal earns a wage of wmed for sure. By exerting stage-two
eﬀort e
∗,TS
i,2 , he has the chance to receive the higher wage whigh instead. In the symmetric
equilibrium, this occurs with probability 1
2. Moreover, he has to pay the cost of eﬀort
exertion in the second stage.
Turning to the analysis of the tournament’s ﬁrst stage, it is obvious that (in expected
values) this stage can be modelled as a one-stage tournament between four agents with
two winner prizes EVi,2 and two loser prizes wlow (see Rosen 1986). The derivation of
equilibrium eﬀort for such a tournament follows the same steps as above. Alternatively
we can apply a result from Orrison et al. (2004) who show that equilibria of fully
symmetric one-stage tournaments are not aﬀected by “organizational replication” for
our speciﬁcation of the production function, cost function, and random terms. This
implies that an equilibrium in a tournament with two identical participants and one
winner prize is also an equilibrium in a tournament with four identical participants and
two winner prizes.4
4More generally Orrison et al. (2004) show that an equilibrium in a tournament with n participants
and 1
2n winner prizes is still an equilibrium in a tournament with mn participants and m
2 n winner
prizes.
7As a shortcut we can therefore use the solution for e
∗,TS
i,2 and simply replace whigh








wmed − wlow + 1








This expression illustrates the two components of incentive provision in multi-stage
tournaments. By winning the ﬁrst stage and qualifying for the ﬁnal, an agent receives
an immediate wage gain (wmed − wlow), but additionally has the option to compete in
the ﬁnal and win the top prize whigh. The value of this option is
1
2








Several aspects of the model deserve special emphasis. First, our design closely
follows the original model of elimination tournaments by Rosen (1986) with one notable
exception: instead of having two semiﬁnals with two participants each, who compete
for one slot in the ﬁnal, we analyze a setup with four participants competing for two
slots in the ﬁnal. While both variants are theoretically equivalent for symmetric agents,
we employ the latter because it allows us to design a one-stage tournament which is
procedurally as close as possible to our main treatment.5 Note also that we abstract
from heterogeneous abilities of participants in order to keep the design as simple and
parsimonious as possible. This allows us to focus on the incentive aspect of elimination
tournaments by ruling out selection of more able individuals into higher positions of
a hierarchy. Including the selection aspect of tournaments would be an interesting
follow-up to our study.
5In particular—as will become clear in the next section—both tournaments have the same number
of participants and subjects compete for the same number of promotions.
83 Experimental design
3.1 Treatments and hypotheses
Our experiment comprises of three treatments that allow us to study behavior in multi-
stage tournaments from diﬀerent angles. For all treatments our benchmark is the
prediction of the symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The main treatment
TS is a two-stage elimination tournament with four participants competing for whigh,
wmed, and wlow as discussed in the previous section. We compare this treatment to
a one-stage tournament (OS) in which four subjects compete for two top positions.
The two subjects with the highest output levels receive a wage w0
med in OS while the
two losers of the competition receive a wage wlow. The OS treatment fulﬁlls several
purposes. First, it serves as a validity check for our results given that a number of
studies on one-stage tournaments already exists. In particular, our parametrization of
this treatment is very close to a treatment from Orrison et al. (2004).
More importantly, however, the OS treatment allows us to investigate whether one-
stage tournaments are behaviorally diﬀerent from multi-stage ones. To investigate this
question we design OS such that it is strategically equivalent to the ﬁrst stage of the two-
stage tournament TS. As discussed in the previous section the ﬁrst stage of a two-stage
tournament can be interpreted as a one-stage tournament in which agents compete for
the expected value of participating in the second stage. Strategic equivalence between
OS and the ﬁrst stage of TS is thus achieved by keeping wlow constant and choosing:
w
0
med = EVi,2 = wmed +
1
2







In other words, the wage for the promoted agents in the one-stage tournament
(w0
med) is equivalent to the wage wmed from TS plus the option value of participating in
the ﬁnal of TS. This choice implies that equilibrium eﬀort levels in the OS treatment
and in the ﬁrst stage of the TS treatment are the same. We can therefore formulate






In addition to comparing behavior in tournaments with diﬀerent numbers of stages,
we are interested in how a change in the wage structure inﬂuences behavior in multi-
stage tournaments. This comparative statics exercise is of practical interest. Wages are
one of the variables which (within certain bounds) are most amenable to manipulation
in organizational design. We therefore compare our main treatment to a second two-
stage tournament with a more convex wage proﬁle (TSC). It is identical to the TS
treatment with the exception that the intermediate wage w00
med in this treatment is
smaller than in TS. This implies weaker incentives (lower equilibrium eﬀort) in the ﬁrst












Finally, we analyze behavior in our main treatment across stages. In the TS treat-
ment wages are chosen such that equilibrium eﬀorts in the ﬁrst and second stage are
equal. Remember that the two elements of incentives in multi-stage tournaments are
the wage spread and the option value of competing for further promotions. In the ﬁnal
stage, the option value is zero because there are no further promotions beyond that
stage. To make the tournament in the TS treatment incentive maintaining in the sense
of Rosen (1986), this decrease in the option value in the second stage is oﬀset by an
appropriate increase in the wage spread (whigh − wmed > wmed − wlow). Comparing






Experimental parameters and the resulting equilibrium eﬀorts for all treatments are
shown in Table 1. When deciding on their eﬀorts, subjects could choose any integer





and i,k ∼ U[−60,60].6 The parameters chosen imply equilibrium eﬀorts of 74 in both
stages of TS and in OS, the lower intermediate wage in TSC changes equilibrium eﬀorts
to 42 in the ﬁrst stage and 100 in the second stage of this treatment.
Treatment OS TS TSC
c 2250 2250 2250
q 60 60 60
whigh – 20 20
w0
med / wmed / w00
med 13.62 12.11 9.33
wlow 5.73 5.73 5.73
e∗
i,1 74 74 42
e∗
i,2 – 74 100
Table 1: Experimental parameters and resulting equilibrium predictions.
3.2 Experimental procedures
The experiment was conducted at the BonnEconLab of the University of Bonn. A total
of 96 subjects in six sessions were divided into groups of four. We employed a one-shot
between-subjects design, i.e., subjects participated either in the OS, the TS or the
TSC treatment. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007); subjects were recruited using the online recruitment system
by Greiner (2003).
Before the tournament started, subjects received detailed written instructions on the
respective treatment they took part in (OS, TS or TSC). These were neutrally framed
6Note that, while in equilibrium all players make positive proﬁts, the range of feasible eﬀorts and
the speciﬁcation of the cost function imply that in principle subjects could make losses. In the few
cases where this occurred, losses were deducted from the showup-fee.
11and did not contain potentially value-laden terms like “tournament”, “ﬁnal”, “winner”,
etc. After reading the instructions subjects completed several control questions. The
experiment started only after all participants had answered all control questions cor-
rectly. During the tournament, subjects simultaneously entered their eﬀort decision
and were then asked to state their expectations about the other participants’ eﬀorts
on the next screen. This question was not announced beforehand. After the ﬁrst stage
participants in TS and TSC were only informed about the realization of their own
random draw and about whether they had been promoted to the second stage. The
ﬁnalists then again made an eﬀort choice and entered their expectation about their
opponent’s eﬀort. At the end of the tournament subjects in all treatments were in-
formed about their earnings and asked to ﬁll in a questionnaire. The structure of the
experimental session ensured that subjects’ decisions in the tournament can be treated
as independent observations. The whole experimental session lasted on average 100
minutes and subjects earned an average of 18.25 Euro (1 Euro = 1.26 USD at the time
of experiment), including a showup-fee of 4 Euro and a ﬁxed payment of 3 Euro for
completing the questionnaire.
Note that our experimental procedures diﬀer from previous tournament experiments
in that we implement a one-shot interaction structure. Previous experiments have
typically used repeated interactions. The advantage of the latter is that it allows for
learning, which is potentially important given the non-trivial decision environment in
tournaments. A potential downside, however, is that repeated game structures question
the validity of static equilibrium predictions. Since we are explicitly interested in testing
theoretical predictions, we decided to use a one-shot design. This has the additional
advantage that stakes in the one-shot interaction are relatively high. We check the
regularity of our results by comparing the outcome of our OS treatment with those of
similar repeated tournaments. Finding similar results would make us conﬁdent that
our main ﬁndings are not driven by the one-shot character of our set-up, but instead
by treatment diﬀerences.
124 Results
In this section we ﬁrst test whether the results for the one-stage tournament replicate
earlier ﬁndings from similar tournaments. We then study the dynamic aspect of multi-
stage tournaments by comparing the one-stage tournament OS to the strategically
equivalent ﬁrst stage of the two-stage tournament TS. In a third step, we investigate
the eﬀects of diﬀerences in the wage structure on eﬀort provision by comparing the
two-stage tournaments TS and TSC. Finally, we address the question whether the TS
treatment is incentive maintaining by analyzing behavior in the ﬁrst and second stage
of the tournament.
4.1 Behavior in the one-stage tournament
Table 2 reports eﬀort decisions in the OS treatment (column 1). Two points are worth
noting. First, eﬀorts are on average very close to the theoretical predictions. While the
average eﬀort of 69.9 is slightly below the Nash prediction of 74, median eﬀort coincides
exactly with the predicted eﬀort level. Second, there is substantial heterogeneity in
subjects’ behavior (see also Figure 1).
Both observations are in line with previous ﬁndings from symmetric one-stage de-
signs (e.g., Bull et al. 1987, Eriksson et al. 2006). In particular, our results replicate
those found by Orrison et al. (2004) who observe an average eﬀort of 73.3 for an almost
identical tournament which was repeated 20 times using lower stakes. The similarity
of our results to those of Orrison et al. (2004) show that one of the most important
ﬁndings in the experimental literature on symmetric promotion tournaments—average
eﬀort being close to Nash predictions—is quite robust with respect to using one-shot
vs. repeated interactions and with respect to increased stake sizes.
Result 1: Average behavior in the one-stage tournament is close to the
predictions of the symmetric Nash equilibrium.
13Treatment OS TS TSC
Average Eﬀort 69.9 89.2 82.4
Median Eﬀort 74 91 83
min(Eﬀort) 1 40 40
max(Eﬀort) 125 125 125
Variance 913.3 359.7 605.4
e∗ 74 74 42
Table 2: First stage behavior in the OS, TS, and TSC treatment.
4.2 Testing behavioral equivalence
Our one-stage tournament and the ﬁrst stage of the two-stage tournament TS are strate-
gically equivalent in the sense that the wage w0
med in the one-stage tournament includes
the equilibrium option value of participating in the second stage of the two-stage tour-
nament. A comparison of eOS
i,1 and eTS
i,1 therefore serves as a test of how subjects in the
two-stage tournament perceive this option value. If subjects, for instance, do not take
the option value into account when deciding on their ﬁrst stage eﬀort in TS, eﬀorts
in this stage should be lower compared to the OS treatment. If subjects evaluate the
option value correctly, eﬀorts in both treatments should be identical. Columns 1 and
2 of Table 2 show that behavior diﬀers strongly between the two treatments. Average
eﬀort in the ﬁrst stage of the TS treatment is 89.2, while median eﬀort is 91. Thus, sub-
jects behave much more competitively in the multi-stage tournament, exerting eﬀorts
which are more than 20% higher than those of their counterparts in the OS treatment.
A Mann-Whitney U-test conﬁrms that this treatment diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant
(p = 0.005, two-sided).
Comparing eﬀort levels in the two treatments to the theoretical predictions derived
in section 3 indicates that it is excess eﬀort in TS rather than “too low” eﬀort in
OS that drives the treatment diﬀerence. A t-test with the null hypothesis that eﬀorts
are equal to Nash predictions conﬁrms this: the null hypothesis is rejected in the TS
14treatment (p < 0.001), but cannot be rejected in OS (p = 0.453).7 Subjects’ eﬀort
choices suggest that they are not naive in the sense that they ignore the second stage.
Quite to the contrary, the two-stage elimination tournament seems to trigger especially
competitive behavior in the ﬁrst stage.
The treatment diﬀerence is not just driven by some subjects choosing extreme eﬀort
levels in the TS treatment. A closer look at the distributions of ﬁrst stage eﬀorts in
Figure 1 reveals instead that the whole eﬀort distribution is shifted to the right in the
TS treatment. As a consequence, eﬀorts are less dispersed (Levene’s test for equality
of variances, p < 0.05, two-sided). The eﬀort distribution illustrates that exerting
excess eﬀort is quite widespread in TS: 84% of subjects choose eﬀorts higher than the
equilibrium eﬀort level of 74. This compares to only 47% in the OS treatment. The
strong diﬀerence between treatments is also reﬂected at the lower tail of the distribution.
While the lowest eﬀort in the OS treatment is 1, no subject exerts eﬀort below 40 in
the TS treatment.
Result 2: Eﬀorts in the ﬁrst round of TS are signiﬁcantly higher than
in the OS treatment. This diﬀerence is driven by excess eﬀort in TS.
4.3 Wage structures in two-stage tournaments
In our next treatment comparison we investigate the behavioral eﬀects of diﬀerent wage
structures in two-stage tournaments. Our main interest concerns the question whether
ﬁrst stage excess eﬀort is a robust phenomenon. Is excess eﬀort in the ﬁrst stage an
artefact of the speciﬁc wage structure we used in the TS treatment, e.g., is it speciﬁc
7Note that the derivation of equilibrium predictions is based on the assumption of risk neutrality. We
check the validity of this assumption by eliciting subjects’ risk preferences with an incentive compatible
lottery procedure. It turns out that our experimental subject pool is close to risk neutrality: the median
subject in all three treatments is risk neutral, and the certainty equivalent of more than 50% of subjects
lies in a range of +/ − 0.25 Euro around the risk neutral certainty equivalent (equal to 2 Euro for the
lottery that was used). In addition, eﬀort levels in TS are above theoretical predictions irrespective of

































Figure 1: Frequency of eﬀort choices in the OS treatment and the ﬁrst stage of the
TS treatment.
to the incentive maintaining wage spreads? Or do we observe excess eﬀort even if we
reduce the incentive to provide eﬀort in the ﬁrst stage? To analyze these questions we
implemented the TSC treatment, which is identical to the TS treatment except that
the subject who produces less output in the second stage receives only w00
med = 9.33
Euro instead of wmed = 12.11 Euro. This more convex wage proﬁle has the following
theoretical implications. Incentives to provide eﬀort in the ﬁrst stage are weakened—
the equilibrium eﬀort level in the ﬁrst stage of TSC is only 42 instead of 74 in the TS
treatment. In the second stage, equilibrium eﬀort increases from 74 to 100 (see Table
1).
Column 3 of Table 2 summarizes behavior in the ﬁrst stage of the TSC treatment.
Eﬀorts in the ﬁrst stage are much higher than theoretically predicted. The average eﬀort
level is 82.4 points, about 40 points higher than the equilibrium eﬀort level of 42. A t-
test with the null hypothesis that eﬀorts are equal to the Nash prediction conﬁrms that
eﬀort choices are signiﬁcantly above the equilibrium prediction (p < 0.001). Indeed,
about 88% of subjects choose eﬀorts higher than 42. This suggests that excess eﬀort
16in the ﬁrst stage of our two-stage tournaments is robust to diﬀerences in the wage
structure. Comparing eﬀort choices in the TSC treatment to those observed in TS
reveals that subjects react only weakly to the change in the wage structure between the
two treatments. Average eﬀort in TSC is only 7 points lower than in TS. This ﬁnding
is striking given that there is a 32-point diﬀerence in equilibrium eﬀorts. Despite the
fact that ﬁrst stage incentives are much weaker than in TS, eﬀort choices do not diﬀer
signiﬁcantly between the two treatments (Mann-Whitney U-test, p = 0.245, two-sided).
Result 3: The more convex wage structure in TSC induces even higher
excess eﬀort in the ﬁrst stage. First stage eﬀorts in TS and TSC are
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, despite much weaker incentives in the TSC
treatment.
4.4 Testing incentive maintenance
Finally, we turn to behavior in the second stage of the TS treatment. Remember that
parameters were chosen such that the tournament in TS is incentive maintaining, i.e.,
equilibrium eﬀort levels are the same (equal to 74) in both stages. We know already
that eﬀorts are above the equilibrium prediction in the ﬁrst stage of TS. In this sense,
we can reject the hypothesis of equilibrium eﬀort choices in both stage of TS. It remains
to show, however, whether eﬀort levels are the same in both stages of the tournament,
or whether they diﬀer. Does the two-stage character of TS induce above equilibrium
eﬀort also in the second stage or do players reduce eﬀorts relative to their ﬁrst stage
behavior?
In turns out that the the evidence is mixed. On average, eﬀort decreases when
comparing behavior across stages in the TS treatment. Average eﬀort in the ﬁrst stage
is 89, in the ﬁnal it goes down to 82. The median eﬀort choice decreases from 91 to
87.5. Note that average eﬀort in the ﬁrst stage includes the eﬀorts of those who did not
make it to the second stage. Since—by design of the promotion tournament—the latter
usually exerted lower eﬀort, the decrease from stage one to stage two is larger if we
17consider only ﬁnalists’ behavior. Their average eﬀort in the ﬁrst stage is 96, implying
that on average ﬁnalists decrease their eﬀort by 14 points. However, these numbers hide
considerable heterogeneity on an individual level: the fraction of ﬁnalists who decrease
their eﬀort in the second stage is only slightly higher than the fraction of subjects who
increase it (50% and 44%, respectively). It is therefore not surprising that the overall
decrease in ﬁnalists’ eﬀorts is insigniﬁcant (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-value = 0.289).
However, those who adjust their eﬀort downwards on average do so much stronger than
those who raise their eﬀort.
Does this mean that excess eﬀort in the ﬁrst stage just mirrors the lower eﬀorts
in the second stage? That is, do subjects expect low eﬀort levels and thus low eﬀort
costs in the second stage and therefore increase their ﬁrst stage eﬀort due to a higher
(perceived) option value? While this might be the case for some ﬁnalists, we can rule
out that it accounts for ﬁrst stage behavior on a more general level as, on average,
eﬀort choices in the second stage are still above the equilibrium prediction. We can
also use the observed ﬁrst stage eﬀort choice of a subject to calculate the option value
implicitly underlying her decision. Using this option value, we can then construct
the (hypothetical) second stage eﬀort level which would rationalize the ﬁrst stage eﬀort
choice of the subject at hand. For instance, if a subject beliefs that all players will exert





c = 0 (see section 2). Assuming this option value instead of the equilibrium
option value rationalizes a ﬁrst stage eﬀort of 97 (using the wages and cost parameters of
TS). Conducting the calculation for the ﬁrst stage eﬀort choice of the median subject
in TS (equal to 91) yields an implied second stage eﬀort of 37. I.e., if the median
subject had expected a second stage eﬀort level of 37, the perceived option value would
rationalize her observed ﬁrst stage eﬀort choice. This value is, however, far below the
actual eﬀort choices in the second stage (cp. Table 2).8 The expectation of low second
8The same exercise for the TSC treatment yields a value of 14 while the average eﬀort level actually
observed in the second stage of this treatment is 82.9. Thus, although subjects on average choose eﬀorts
below the equilibrium value of 100 in the second stage of TSC, this cannot explain the excess eﬀorts
18stage eﬀort levels can thus not account for the observed excess eﬀort in the ﬁrst stage
of TS.
Result 4: Eﬀorts in the second stage of TS are lower, but not signif-
icantly diﬀerent from eﬀorts in the ﬁrst stage. In this sense, the TS
treatment is incentive maintaining.
5 Concluding remarks
Promotions in most hierarchical organizations take the form of multi-stage elimination
tournaments. In this paper we have studied behavior in such tournaments with simple
laboratory experiments. Our results demonstrate the importance of carefully analyzing
the incentive eﬀects of promotions in multi-level hierarchies. They show that the basic
logic of incentive provision in multi-stage elimination tournaments works in the sense
that people take future promotion possibilities into account when deciding on current
work eﬀort. However, we also observe important departures from theoretical predic-
tions. Subjects tend to exert excess eﬀort in the ﬁrst stage of our two-stage elimination
tournament. By contrast, we do not observe this phenomenon in a strategically equiv-
alent one-stage tournament. Under a more convex wage structure, the overprovision of
eﬀort is even more pronounced.
Our experiments suggest that behavior in multi-stage tournaments deviates from
behavior in one-stage tournaments in a systematic way. Our data do, however, not
allow us to give a deﬁnite answer on the precise mechanism that causes this change
in behavior. Several factors may act in concert: it could be that subjects experience
additional non-monetary “joy of winning” when being promoted (Parco et al. 2005),
which might be more pronounced when the hierarchy has more layers. An additional
potential rationale for subjects’ behavior are preferences for status (Moldovanu et al.
2007). Multi-stage tournaments with their more precise deﬁnition of hierarchical level
exerted in the ﬁrst stage.
19(and status) might trigger especially competitive behavior of status concerned agents.
Our data on subjects’ expectations are consistent with these interpretations: about two
thirds of subjects choose an eﬀort above the second-highest eﬀort level that they expect
from their competitors, irrespective of the absolute level of the eﬀort expectation.
The observed behavior could also help to rationalize why ﬁrms rely so strongly on
promotions as incentive device, even in work environments where more direct perfor-
mance pay is feasible. Excess eﬀort in early stages of multi-stage tournaments makes
this form of incentive provision comparatively “cheap” for the principal as it decreases
the wage cost per unit of eﬀort. For instance, in our TS tournament this cost is 9.81
Cent in theory, but only 8.36 Cent in practice. This implies that a principal who imple-
mented the TS wage scheme had to pay less for every unit of eﬀort (and production)
than theoretically predicted. Which wage proﬁle a principal or tournament designer
actually prefers depends on his objectives. In some situations it might be suﬃcient
to concentrate on the cost per eﬀort. In other situations a tournament designer may,
for example, put special emphasis on the performance of agents in higher stages of the
tournament. The TSC treatment suggests that excess eﬀort in early stages eventually
might come at the cost of reduced performance in later stages if the wage structure
becomes too convex. Independent of the speciﬁc objective function, a tournament de-
signer should take into account that agents’ behavior can ultimately change the optimal
architecture of promotion tournaments in terms of wage proﬁles, promotion rates, etc.
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